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RECENT CASEof COMMENTS
Hagberg: Insurance--Forfeiture
Policy--Insanity Not an Excuse for Failu
rights,' but the mere opinion of the chancellor with no decree
adjudicating them is not enough." For an appeal it is not necessary that there be an actual enforcement of the relief sought," or
that the principles adjudicated be applied to the facts of the case . '
But there must be a decree putting these principles into effeet, for
otherwise the appellant has suffered no prejudice.'
Both of the statutes in question were taken from the Code
of Virginia, but they were not there construed together until
after West Virginia had adopted the statute authorizing the transfer of causes from one forum to the other. In Virginia it has
been held that a decree dismissing a suit in equity, with leave to
transfer the cause to the law court, is not final, but it is appealable as a decree adjudicating the principles of the cause?' Since
the effect of such a decree is to deny to the plaintiff all of the
relief sought in his bill, the case seems to be correct in the light
of both precedent and principle.
-PAUL D. FARR.

INSURANCE - FORFEITURE OF POLICY INSANITY NOT AN
EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY INSURER AS TO TOTAL DISABILITY.

- An insurance policy provided that, upon the insured's giving
notice of total disability before default in payment of premiums,
further payment thereof would be ,excused during the disability.
The insured was adjudged insane previous to the due date of a
premium. While so incapacitated, the period of grace expired,
that portion of subsection 1, which allows an appeal to any decree or order
'adjudicating
the principles of the cause' ").
18
Reed v. Cline's Heirs, 9 Gratt. 136 (1852) (Bill to enforce a title bond
for sale of land, and after statute of limitations pleaded, court directed an
issue to try whether the bond had been executed and lost. Held, that this
impliediy adjudicates the plaintiff's right, as not barred by the statute of

limitations).

"Armstrong v. Ross, 56 W. Va. 16, 48 S. E. 475 (1904).
2Richmond v. Richmond, 62 W. Va. 206, 57 S. E. 736 (1907) (The decree ordered partition of certain lands, but the actual partition had not been
made).
2Wood et at. v. Harmison et aL, 41 W. Va. 376, 23 S. E. 560 (1895).
'Garrett v. Garrett et als., 91 W. Va. 243, 112 S. E. 494 (1922) (The
decree sustained a demurrer to an affirmative answer, but did not dismiss
the answer or give any relief sought in the bill); Watson v. Wigginton, 28
W. Va. 533, 552 (1886) (The trial court may correct the errors committed,
or commit others, before enforcing the decree); Steenrod v. Railroad Co.,
25 W. Va. 133 (1884).
'Colvin et at. v. Butler, 150 Va, 672, 143 S. E. 333 (1928) ; Hodges & De
Jarnette v. Thornton et al.,
138 Va. 112, 120 S. E. 865 (1924).
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no payment of premium having been made, nor notice of disability having been given to the company.
The plaintiff, as committee, seeks, in equity, to have the policy declared to be in full
force. Held: The policy lapsed. lannerelli v. Kansas City Life
Insurance Company.'
It is a well-settled rule that no excuse for failure to pay
premiums can be offered to avert a forfeiture, save (a) War in some jurisdictions.
(b) Insolvency of the insurer.
(c) Refusal of tendered premiums.
(d) Any wrongful act of insurer preventing payment.
(e) Want of notice, when it is the duty of the insurer to give
notice.
(f) Waiver of prompt payment.'
An act of God, sickness or insanity rendering the insured wholly
incapable of attending to business affords no defense for failure
to pay premiums when due, and will not avoid a lapse of the
policy. The reason usually given is that the act required is not
necessarily personal to the insured, but may be performed by
another for him.'
However, the payment of premiums may be waived by the
intervention in the policy of a "disability clause", provided the
company be given notice, in the form of proof of total disability
before default in the payment of premiums. If notice is given,
then payment of premiums will be waived. There is a division
in the authorities as to the effect of failure to give notice. One
line of authority holds that notice of the disability is a condition
precedent, which must be performed prior to default in the payment of premiums. Sickness or insanity of the insured, which
has made it impossible for him to give the requisite notice, will
x171 S. E. 748 (W. Va. 1933); Accord: Da Corte v. New York Life Ins.
Co.,
2 171 S. E. 248 (W. Va. 1933).
VAxcE ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 291; but see W. VA. REv. CODE
(1931) c. 33, art. 3, § 18 (Rights of insured after default in payment of

premium).
:Klein v. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 88, 26 L. Ed. 662 (1881); Thompson

v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 252, 26 L. Ed. 765 (1881); Carpenter v. Centennial Mut. Life Ass'n, 68 Iowa 453, 27 N. W. 456, 56 Am.
St. Rep. 96 (1895); Roeci v. Mass. 'ccid. Co., 222 Mass. 336, 110 N. E.
972 (1916); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 122 Miss. 813, 85 So. 93,

15 A. L. B. 314 and note p. 318 (1920).
'See cases, supra n. 3 (In these cases, the courts have applied the wellestablished doctrine, that non-performance of a contract which does not require or contemplate performance by the promisor personally, is not excused
by impossibility of performance).
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not prevent the forfeiture.' The other line of authority escapes
forfeiture of the policy by holding that, while notice may in
theory be a condition precedent, yet its performance is excused
by the total disability; alternatively, such cases hold notice is
simply a condition subsequent, the non-fulfillment of which will
not be permitted to extinguish "accrued rights".' Many of the
decisions cited in this group involve fire and accident insurance
litigation.' These can be distinguished from the principal case,
in that, at the time of the disability, the interest has vested; and
where the loss insured against has already been suffered, all
further acts required of the insured are to be viewed as conditions
subsequent, thus to be excused by impossibility of performance.'
In the able concurring opinion of the present case, it is argued
that notice has merely the effect of waiver of payment of
premiums: if proper notice has not been given, the policy automatically lapses, and in such event there are no provisions for
From the angle of strict construction this
its reinstatement.!
may be true, but the insurance contract being one of adhesion,"
5 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, mspra n. 3; Wick v. Western Union
Life Ins. Co., 104 Wash. 129, 175 Pac. 953 (1918); Hanson v. Life Ins. Co.,
229 Ill. App. 15 (1923); Courson v. Life Ins. Co., 295 Pa. 518, 145 Atl. 530
(1929) (Suit for the recovery of premiums. The insurance company was
paying the benefits of the policy without protest); Yohalem v. Life Ins. Co.,
136 Misc. 748, 240 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1930); Smith v. Life Ins. Co., 134 Kan.
426, 7 P. (2d) 65 (1932); Dean v. Life Ins. Co., 175 Ga. 321, 165 S. E.
235 (1932); Berry v. Life Ins. Co., 165 Miss. 405, 142 So. 44 (1932);
Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U. S. 489, 52 S. Ct. 230, 76 L. Ed.
416 (1932); Egan v. Life Ins. Co., 60 F. (2d) 268 (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1932)
(The condition is, "if insured furnish proof of the disability and not the
disability itself."); New England Mnt. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala.
307, 116 So. 151 (1928) (It was urged that waiver of premiums was but a
further method of paying the premiums and thus impossibility of perform.
ance would not excuse payment).
' Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Hazard, 148 Ky. 465, 146 S.W. 1107 (1912);
Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 108 Neb. 845, 189 N. W. 388, 29 A. L. R.
1507 (1922); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carrol, 209 Ky. 522, 273 S.W.
54 (1925); Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783, 297 S.
W. 847, 54 A. L. B. 600 (1927); Levan v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 138 S. C.
253, 136 S.E. 304 (1927); Minnesota Inc. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F. (2d) 977
(C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. LeFevere, 10 S. W.
(2d) 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,
196 N. C. 717, 147 S. E. 6 (1929); Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Ins. Co.,
199 N. C. 419, 154 S. E. 149 (1930); Swan v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 156
Va.
7 852, 159 S. E. 192, reported subsequently 168 S. E. 423 (1931).
Rhyne v. Life Ins. Co., sapra n. 6; Levan v. Met. Life Ins. Co., supra
n. 6.
'VAcE, rupra n. 2 at p. 1788. See New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Reynolds, supra n. 5 (where the distinguishment is made). Obviously, it
might be argued similarly that, with the event of the disability, the interest
under the life policy has also vested, notice of such disability being required merely for purposes of verification. The cases, however, attempt no
such analogy.
lIannerelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., supra n. 1.
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ought not to be governed by meticulous rules of contract law.'
Supervening impossibility of performance should apply equally
to conditions precedent as well as to conditions subsequent.1
"Where the failure to perform is the result of impossibility, it
would seem fair to excuse non-performance, inasmuch as the insurer has been paid for its additional obligation and is slightly,
if at all, prejudiced by the omission to notify.''
Judicial opinion, which thus forbids lapse of the policy, does so by attacking
the innate injustice of a contract, that by its technicalities might
work forfeiture because of lack of notice. It is probable that the
possibility of fraud may have somewhat influenced the West Virginia court in reaching its strict decision. ' Nevertheless, the insured's "total disability" in the .case at bar would seem to have
been a matter of public record, since his confinement in the aslyum
occurred by court order. ' Hence, little justification for any fraud
motif is to be discerned here'
Unless the case can be supported
upon the "theory of the bill",' from the angle of equity pleading,
the result would appear to facilitate a forfeiture. Surely, modern
equity should abhor such an outcome. 8
-R. E. HAGBERG.
"VANCE,

supra n. 2, at pp. 201, 215.

"WOODRUFF,

CASES ON INSURANCE (2d ed.) 5 ("What do they know of
the law of the insurance contract, who only the law of contract know?").
'-See Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 1016. Cf., as to the effect of initial
impossibility in the performance of a condition precedent, in Roman law,
GAIUS, III., § 98, holding the stipulation of no effect if subject to such condition, (-the common law ace., Co. LiTT. 206a); INSTITUTES, IMI., 19, § 11;
SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN REcHTS, III., § 124, citing
DIGEST, XLIV., 7, 31. As to the civil law, see FRENCH CIrm CODE, arts.
1172-1173; GERMAN Civm CODE, § 158.
"Lez non cogit ad impossibilia, - (the law does not compel the impossible). BROOM's LEGAL MAXIms, (9th ed.) 171". Hatcher, J., writing in
Watson v. Watson, 168 S. E. 373, 374 (W. Va. 1933).
23 See Note
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1021, 1022.
"See W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 33, art. 3, § 32 (providing for penalties
in certain cases of fraud in obtaining money from an insurance company).
"Presumably, by virtue of the provisions of W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) C.
27, art. 2.
20Unquestionably, frauds currently perpetrated on insurance companies
should require careful safeguards against abuse of the total disability
privilege. Hence, in a majority of instances, there might be adequate
justification for rigid enforcement of the notice provision.
On the other
hand, the harsh penalty may seem unconscionable, as here, where there is
ample opportunity for verification.
'7LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF EqUITY PLEADING (1883)

61.

'The present case is unusual, in that the court of equity has deliberately
refused to relieve against supervening impossibility, even though complainant
obviously had no remedy at law. Perhaps, the fact that the insured was
still alive, albeit insane, may have actuated the court to a considerable extent. In any event, the circumstance that the Virginia decision on practically the same facts achieves an opposite result, should be significant. See
Swan v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., supra n. 6.
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